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I.
ProfessorJeremy Waldron's When Justice Replaces Affection: The
Need for Rights, raises the question: What role, if any, remains
for institutional rights within the communitarian framework?
The question is interesting only if the contrast between liber-
alism and communitarianism is characterized as a difference be-
tween a political ideology that is rights-based (liberalism) and
one that is anti-rights-based (communitarianism). Indeed, Pro-
fessor Waldron characterizes the difference in precisely that
way. The communitarian rejects liberalism, which he sees as an
ideology whose core concepts are property, markets, and
rights, whose guiding regulative norm is impartial justice, and
whose meta-ethic is subjective, relative, and contractarian. As
communitarians characterize liberalism, all important socio-
political, economic and legal institutions are contractual, or
market based; and justice itself can be treated as the outcome
of a rational contract among idealized, individually rational au-
tonomous agents.
The recent turn in contractarian moral and political theory to
a preoccupation with the economist's ideal of perfect competi-
tion' gives further expression to the communitarian characteri-
zation of the liberal ideology. Under conditions of perfect
competition, individuals are able to maximize the satisfaction
of their preferences. When the conditions of perfect competi-
tion are not realized, however, rational individuals must coop-
erate with one another to secure gains otherwise unavailable.
Cooperation is rational only if it is to each person's advantage.
Rational cooperative schemes consist in sets of normative con-
straints. These constraints restrict the domain within which in-
dividuals can pursue their rational self-interest. They provide
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alternative reasons or motivations for action, namely moral rea-
sons. Thus, norms specifying the terms of cooperation, like jus-
tice, emerge among individuals as instruments for securing
gains that would otherwise be unattainable. Justice is a rational
response to market failure and is therefore part of a realm of
mutually advantageous social interaction.
Because in order to be rational these norms of cooperation
must be to each person's advantage, it is possible to character-
ize them as the outcome of a rational bargain or "hypothetical
social contract." In this characterization of liberalism, social life
is reduced to markets and contracting. When markets succeed,
contracts are enforceable by the existence of alternatives. De-
fection incentives are weak or nonexistent. When markets fail,
self-interested defection is more attractive. In that case, moral
or legal norms are necessary to encourage rational coopera-
tion. Because they are to the advantage of all parties, these
norms can themselves be treated as the outcome of a contract.
Thus, the basic institutions of society, markets, and the norms
governing response to market failure, are fundamentally con-
tractual. We are encouraged to contemplate the role of political
justice in our social life in precisely the same way we think of
market contracting: That is, as a regulative constraint for mu-
tual advantage among a "society of strangers." So it seems that
"the market," "contract," and the consequent conception of
justice as contract and as a dimension of the domain of mutual
advantage are at the core of liberal individualism. Indeed, the
communitarian might argue, they are constitutive of it.
The new communitarianism denies that social relations are
best thought of as contractual or quasi-contractual. In doing so,
it denies two things. First, it denies that communities can be
analyzed or "rationally reconstructed" as contracts-real,
quasi, or hypothetical. The bonds of community are not limited
to, nor are they fundamentally, matters of rational, voluntary
agreement. Second, because community is not simply a form of
multi-party contract, it is a mistake to understand the relation-
ships among its members as being governed primarily by con-
tractual norms, in particular, by claims of right and by appeals
to justice.
There are, of course, all manner of social institutions that are
not best understood in market or contract terms. The family is
a useful example. The concept of family includes the notion
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that each member takes an interest in the well-being of the
others, and, therefore, takes full account of the others' interests
in family matters. At its best, the family is an institution regu-
lated by "affective emotions," not by self-interest. Thus, fami-
lies are not best construed as regulated by justice, nor are the
claims its members bring to bear on one another those ofjus-
tice or of right.
Friendship also resists a contractual analysis. Friendships are
not bargains struck for mutual advantage. To be someone's
friend is, among other things, to care about what happens to
that person for his sake, not for one's own sake. Families and
friendships are mutually enriching, but their point is not to
promote self-interest.
In denying that the basic and important institutions of soci-
ety are contractual, the communitarian critique makes both
critical and positive claims. The critical claim is perhaps best
understood as a reminder: Namely, that our appreciation of so-
cial life and political organization need not be constrained by
the liberal vision of it. This is the vision they have identified
with rational, autonomous agency, the market paradigm, the
priority of justice, and of the right over the good, as well as
with contractarian meta-ethics.
Communitarianism is not just a negative thesis, however. It
has a positive side as well, though it is quite hard to figure out
precisely what its central claims are. When one rejects the con-
tract-property model of social organization, with what does one
replace it? Instead of the bonds that tie being those of a com-
mitment to cooperate on fair terms, that is, the terms ofjustice
and rights, what becomes the common ground of community?
Characterizing communitarianism's core thesis is one of the
central challenges Professor Waldron faces. He appears to take
the core of communitarianism to consist in the transformative
possibility of replacing the idea of society as brought together
to cooperate on fair terms with an ideal of society as based pri-
marily on the "affective emotions." Professor Waldron then
asks whether such a vision is essentially incomplete-whether,
in particular, the communitarian will still find appeals to rights
central.2
2. Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, I 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 625, 631-32 (1988).
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II.
In order to assess communitarianism, then, we need to evalu-
ate both its critical and positive claims. It is not at all obvious
that the communitarian critique of liberalism is compelling.
First, to the extent it identifies liberalism with particular meta-
ethical claims (for example, foundationalism, contractarianism,
the subjectivity of value, and the like), it simply is confused.
Not all liberals are contractarians or foundationalists.
Buchanan, Gauthier, Hobbes, Kant, Locke, Nozick, Rawls, and
Rousseau, for example, are contractarians; Bentham, Dworkin,
Mill, and Feinberg are not. Gauthier is a foundationalist; Rawls
is not. Gauthier, Nozick, and Dworkin are market enthusiasts; it
is not obvious, however, that either Rawls or Scanlon is.3
It is also fashionable for communitarians to criticize liber-
alism for being committed to a metaphysically thin conception
of the person, abstracted from social relations. This criticism is
often made of Rawls.4 But it simply is confused to think that
Rawls is committed to an atomistic, impoverished conception
of the person. Rawls believes that all persons have a capacity
for meaningful social relations, and that it is important for each
to possess primary goods necessary to secure enduring per-
sonal and social ties, and for society's basic structure to permit
and foster such ties. For Rawls, individuals are social entities in
just the sense communitarians claim they are, and in just the
sense they claim Rawls denies they are. How can this confusion
be explained?
In Rawls's view, the person is conceived of in two distinct
ways, and for two distinct methodological reasons. We are all
individuals capable of social ordering. Yet in asking ourselves
whether our distinct forms of social ordering or cooperation
are just, we are to engage in a thought experiment. In that ex-
periment, each of us is to imagine whether the principles gov-
erning our relations would have been chosen by individuals in
the so-called original position. In the original position, individ-
uals are more thinly characterized. No attention is given to
3. Among the contractarians, seeJ. BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962);
D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); R. NOZIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974);J. RAWLS, A THEORY oFJUsTICE (1971); Scanlon, Contractarianism and Utilitarian-
ism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982). For noncon-
tractarian liberals, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. FEINBERG,
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984).
4. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982).
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their socially constituted selves, other than the fact that each
person knows that he and others have a capacity for important
social relations.
The charge that Rawls is committed to a metaphysically use-
less conception of the self, one that is too thin because it fails to
take account of each individual's socially constitutive dimen-
sions, is simply confused. Rawls is committed to the social self
as a fact about each of us, but it is not a fact that gets replicated
in the original position. The importance of social relations is rec-
ognized by Rawls within the domain of his discussion of pri-
mary goods, not in the original position. There are, of course,
other facts about us that are similarly denied status in the origi-
nal position. It is a mistake to claim that Rawls's overall concep-
tion of the person merely is his characterization of individuals
in the original position.
One has to remember that Rawls's commitment to the thin
self is methodological only. For it plays a role only in the argu-
ment for the principles of justice. There, his claim is that the
principles chosen by rational, disinterested, thinly conceived
individuals behind a thick veil of ignorance constitute justice.
One can disagree with this characterization of the original
position. For example, why are Rawlsian individuals risk averse,
rather than risk neutral? Why must the veil be so thick? Some
might even argue that the Rawlsian individual is too thick be-
cause it includes a sense of justice and a conception of the
good. Thinner conceptions of the person might require us to
view the individual as no more than a bundle of first-order
preferences. Of course, the communitarian can charge that
while Rawls's individuals are thicker than the economist's bun-
dle of preferences, they are still too thin.
Notice the argument now takes a different form. The com-
munitarian can no longer claim that Rawls, the liberal, is com-
mitted to a metaphysically thin conception of the self. Rather,
the communitarian critique is that by failing to replicate the so-
cially constitutive self in the original position, Rawls begs cer-
tain questions. For the kinds of institutions that are likely to be
just on Rawls's account will necessarily depend on his charac-
terization of the original position. In short, the original posi-
tion is not normatively neutral.
By the same token, a communitarian conception of the per-
son may render defensible forms of association that might be
653
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unjust on the Rawlsian account. For example, the Rawlsian
contractarian picture may favor voluntary forms of association
for mutual advantage, whereas a communitarian characteriza-
tion of the initial position might permit certain nonvoluntary
associative forms. But then the communitarian conception is
not normatively neutral either.
None of this is surprising, of course. Harsanyi is right. Per-
sons who are ex ante risk neutral rather than risk averse choose
the principle of average utility, not the difference principle.5
Altruists might well choose principles of cooperation very dif-
ferent from those favored by disinterested maximizers. It thus
cannot be surprising that a communitarian or very thick con-
ception of the individual in the original position could lead us
to differing visions of the terms of social cooperation. But this
is very different from saying that liberalism is committed to an
impoverished conception of the person generally. If communi-
tarianism's criticism of Rawls is just the claim that different
conceptions of the person in the original position may legiti-
mate different forms of association, it is not false; it is simply
not very interesting. It has not told us why Rawls is wrong to
account for the importance of our social relations in terms of
primary goods rather than in the original position.
What of the communitarian's positive claim? Here I want to
follow Professor Waldron's characterization of its central claim:
the vision of social ordering in which reliance on rights is re-
placed by the affective emotions. Within this framework, polit-
ical discourse "will be informal and engaged rather than
impersonal and abstract. Political thought will be a matter of
the discovery and recognition of the particular social selves we
are, rather than the deliberate choice and articulation of ab-
stract principles of right."'
The gist of Professor Waldron's argument is that social and
political arrangements based primarily on affective emotions
are too uncertain and confining. Rights are then necessary to
reduce uncertainty and to provide frameworks for expanding
possibilities. The argument essentially is this. In one sense, a
system of individual rights provides a fallback position when
5. See Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in EsSAYS ON ETHICS, So-
CIAL BEHAVIOR AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (Dordrecht ed. 1976).
6. Waldron, supra note 2, at 631.
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the bonds of affection erode or fail. Speaking of marriage Pro-
fessor Waldron writes:
[T]here is a need for an array of formal and legalistic rights
and duties, not to constitute the affective bond, but to pro-
vide each person with secure knowledge of what she can
count on in the unhappy event that there turns out to be no
other basis for her dealings with her erstwhile partner in the
relationship. 7
In the context of care for the aged, Professor Waldron makes
similar remarks:
To insist, then, in a communitarian spirit, that care for the
aged should remain the responsibility of the family, we
would have to accept either or maybe both of two costs. We
would have to place limits on the other demands that adult
children would be permitted to respond to, the risks they
could run, and the mobility they could seek. (I suspect, by
the way, that in the present state of things, this would in-
volve limiting once again the capacity of women to move and
flourish outside the home. A great many of the concerns
about communitarianism articulated in this paper are above
allfeminist concerns.) Or, if we were not prepared to do that
(and maybe even if we were) we would have to accept the
cost of exposing the elderly to a certain amount of insecurity
and uncertainty in addition to the other burdens of their age.
Neither in this country nor in Europe have people been will-
ing to accept those costs. Instead, we have opted for less per-
sonal, less affective modes of care. People are encouraged to
purchase an income for their old age in the marketplace, so
they can rely on a pension check from a finance house even if
they cannot rely on the warm support of their children. And,
as a fall-back position, the impersonal agencies of the state
guarantee an income, either to all the elderly, or to those
who have not made or have not been able to make imper-
sonal provision for themselves. Thus, although we may not
care for them on a face-to-face basis, we both provide imper-
sonal structures to enable them to care for themselves, and
we respond collectively and impersonally as a society to the
rights that they have to our support.
8
Professor Waldron's characterization of the system of rights
as constituting a fall-back position is somewhat misleading. Be-
cause they provide security, rights free individuals to explore
possibilities they might otherwise be disinclined to explore. For
7. Id. at 629.
8. Id. at 636 (emphasis in original).
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by guarding against the worst eventualities, these rights reduce
the costs of pursuing more imaginative, riskier possibilities.
There is a sense in which knowing that one can fall only so far
enables one to extend one's reach. Perhaps in this sense the
impersonal scheme of rights is necessary for, or at least
strongly facilitates, social relations based primarily on affection.
It is perhaps better to think of rights not as constitutive of
social relations but, rather, as defining the framework or basic
structure within which social relations take shape and flourish.
Rights and legal structures provide recipes for the creation of
social relations. This, of course, closely resembles Professor
Hart's view of the secondary rules of a legal system.9 Whereas
the primary rules specify rights and duties, secondary rules are
meta-rules. 10 They are about primary rules in the sense that
they specify recipes for constructing, amending, eliminating,
and adjudicating primary rules.
We might now understand the communitarian critique as fol-
lows. What we should want to eliminate is the reliance on pri-
mary rules that impose rights and duties to specify our social
relations. What the communitarian cannot convince anyone of
is the justification for eliminating reliance on secondary rules.
Professor Waldron picks up this line of argument in his ac-
count of Romeo and Juliet. As Professor Waldron correctly
notes, the tragedy of Romeo and Juliet is not the result of Friar
Lawrence's letter failing to get through. Rather, it is that
"[t]here is nothing outside the structures of their warring clans
that these two can rely on-no points of salience, no common
framework of expectations, and no public knowledge-just
their own meagre resources and those of their understandably
pusillanimous allies."' 1
The lesson of Romeo and Juliet is the need for a "structure
of rights that people can count on for organizing their lives, a
structure which stands somewhat apart from communal or af-
fective attachments and which can be relied on to survive as a
basis for action no matter what happens to those attach-
ments."12 These are "what Hart called secondary rules of
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
10. Id. at 78-79.
11. Waldron, supra note 2, at 633.
12. Id. at 634.
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III.
I want to take one step further the argument for impersonal
institutions and formal structures even within a society whose
social bonds are primarily based on the affective emotions. In
doing so, I want to present an argument for the market that I
have elsewhere attributed to Professor Frank Knight. 14 It is an
argument for a market economy, like the arguments Professor
Waldron advances for legalism, that, even in his transformative
vision, the communitarian must acknowledge.
The standard argument for laissez-faire market economies is
that they are both Pareto-efficient and libertarian. In virtue of
each agent's fully voluntary actions, the economy secures a
Pareto-optimal outcome. That is, purely voluntary interaction
yields a result in which no one can be made any better off with-
out making others worse off.
There is no reason to believe that communitarians would be
much impressed by this defense of the market. First, there is
nothing in efficiency per se that is attractive to a communitarian.
Although there is something attractive about consensus or
agreement, the communitarian rejects the idea that society's
basic institutions are simply rational contracts. Indeed, one
could say that it is the liberal preoccupation with markets that
so enrages the communitarian. What makes me think, then,
that a communitarian would be driven to accept the form of
institution-namely, the market-that, it appears, he most
deplores?
In outline, the argument is this: At bottom all social institu-
tions are schemes of cooperation, in that they are expressions
of the ways in which we organize our relationships with one
another over various domains of activity. In order to endure,-
these institutions must rely on an underlying genuine consen-
sus that, in a large heterogeneous society like our own, is obvi-
ously difficult to secure and fragile once achieved. If they are to
endure, the institutions that emerge to govern social interac-
tion cannot generally call into question the nature and scope of
the underlying consensus. In markets, individuals act on their
13. Id.
14. See Coleman, supra note I.
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own conception of the good within a framework of normative
constraints-the absence of force, fraud, and nonpecuniary ex-
ternalities. We need not approve of each other's preferences,
or the ways in which we order them, in order for us to relate to
one another for mutual advantage over a very large domain.
That is the fundamental virtue of markets and, in my view, the
source of their attraction to us. They maximize beneficial inter-
action while minimizing the stress on the underlying
consensus.
The supreme and inestimable merit of the exchange
mechanism is that it enables a vast number of people to co-
operate in the use of means to achieve ends as far as their
interests are mutual, without arguing or in any way agreeing
about either the ends or the methods of achieving them. It is
the "obvious and simple system of natural liberty." The
principle of freedom, where it is applicable, takes other val-
ues out of the field of social action. In contrast, agreement
on terms of co-operation through discussion is hard and al-
ways threatens to become impossible, even to degenerate
into a fight, not merely the failure of co-operation and loss of
its advantages. The only agreement called for in market rela-
tions is acceptance of the one essentially negative ethical
principle, that the units are not to prey upon one another
through coercion or fraud. 5
On one reading, the communitarian takes issue with the so-
called legal liberal because of the latter's endorsement of the
primacy of justice and of the right over the good. In this view,
justice and the law that embody it are best characterized as
norms regulating the affairs of "strangers." A richer apprecia-
tion of the primacy of social roles and relations would, in this
view, give rise to a very different sort of social, political, and
legal structure, one that deemphasized adjudication based on
rights and competing claims. Instead of endorsing an adver-
sarial scheme in which disputes are resolved by adjudicating
the legitimacy of claims representing disparate interests
pressed against one another, we would build institutions that
emphasized open and full conversation, conciliation, and con-
vergence. These institutions, recognizing our inherent reliance
on one another for our own identities, would encourage us to
15. Knight, The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics, rprinted in ON THE HISTORY
AND METHOD OF ECONOMICS 267 (1956).
658 [Vol. 11
HeinOnline  -- 11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  658 1988
No. 3] Comment: Rights, Markets, and Community
seek common ground, not to compromise by giving in but to
do so by seeing the underlying commonality of our condition.
If Professor Knight is correct about the relation of markets to
stability, this communitarian vision may be just so much ro-
mantic fantasy. Were we to take seriously the need for endur-
ing social relations, we would very likely set up institutions that
did not at every turn press us to explore the depth of our com-
mitment. No relationship, however strong, can withstand con-
tinuous strain on its foundation. Thus, we would as good
communitarians very likely create all those liberal institutions-
for example, law seen as norms governing relations among
strangers and impersonal free markets-that, in theory at least,
we decry. If what we really want to do is cooperate broadly over
persons and time, we will do better by setting up institutions
that are, broadly speaking, competitive. And if we are non-ideal
or nonromantic communitarians at heart, we had best act at
least over a large domain of interactions as if we were legal
liberals.
Like a system of rights that makes possible a domain of social
ties based primarily on the affective emotions, impersonal mar-
kets allow us to interact over a wide range of activities in ways
that do not place undue stress on the strength and depth of
those ties. Even within the communitarian framework, it is im-
possible to displace the centrality of informal and impersonal
institutions and structures.
659
HeinOnline  -- 11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  659 1988
HeinOnline  -- 11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  660 1988
